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Abstract: One of the reasons why market economies are able to thrive is
that they exploit the willingness of entrepreneurs to take risks that laborers
might prefer to avoid. Markets work because they remunerate good judge-
ment and punish mistakes. Indeed, modern contract theory is based on the
assumption that principals are less risk averse than agents. We investigate
if the risk preferences of entrepreneurs are different from those of laborers
by implementing experiments with a random sample of the population in a
fast-growing, small-manufacturing, economic cluster. As assumed by theory,
we find that entrepreneurs are more likely to take risks than hired managers.
These results are robust to the inclusion of a series of controls. This lends
support to the idea that risk preferences are an important determinant of se-
lection into occupations. Finally, our lotteries are good predictors of financial
decisions, thus giving support to the external validity of our risk measures
and experimental methods.
* This work was completed while Castillo and Petrie were on leave at University
of Pittsburgh. We are grateful to Lise Vesterlund and the Economics Department
for their hospitality and to Lise Vesterlund for her helpful comments.
1. Introduction
A basic intuition in economics is that trade is not possible without het-
erogeneity of preferences or assets and that markets are best equipped to
allocate resources and abilities to tasks. This paper takes this intuition to
task by looking at risk. We investigate if risk preferences are heterogeneous
in the field and if markets allocate people to tasks based on their risk prefer-
ences. We do this by implementing an artefactual field experiment (Harrison
and List, 2004) on a random sample of managers in a fast-growing economic
cluster.
The idea that markets need agents that are willing to take risks in order to
develop dates back, at least, to Cantillon (1732). Later authors, like Knight
(1921) and Hayek (1969), note that entrepreneurs are needed to bear any ex-
tra gains and losses from the efficient allocation of resources. However, there
is no universal agreement that entrepreneurs must be willing to bear more
risks. Schumpeter (1950), for instance, argues that, as markets develop, it is
financial systems that should bear risks and not particular agents. However,
in the presence of information asymmetries, there is no guarantee that finan-
cial markets will be able to absorb all risk. Perhaps the area of economics
where the role of risk preferences is most explicit is that of contract theory.
Standard treatments of the principal-agent model (Kreps, 1990) show that
principals are able to offer incentive-compatible contracts that exploit the
relative risk aversion of principals and agents. In this paper, we empirically
investigate this asymmetry of risk.
There is little empirical evidence corroborating the basic assumption that
principals are less risk averse than agents. Previous work has used hypothet-
ical risky investment questions or situational questions to measure risk, and
comparisons have been across the general population and across various sec-
tors. The evidence is mixed. In early work, using mailed surveys to assess risk
propensity, Brockhaus (1980) and Masters and Meier (1988) find no differ-
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ence between owners and managers. Cramer, Hartog, Jonker and Van Praag
(2002) find a link between an ex-post hypothetical lottery risk measure and
entrepreneurial choice at some previous point in a person’s life, however, they
caution that their results are not causal. Ekelund, Johansson, Jarvelin and
Lichtermann (2005) use a psychological measure of "fear of uncertainty" to
measure risk. They find a direct link between their risk measure and being
self-employed. More generally, Bonin, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman and Sunde
(2006) use a hypothetical risky investment question to measure risk and find
a correlation between risk and variance in earnings across occupations.
A challenge in testing the hypothesis of heterogeneity of preferences is
that we rarely observe people in these conditions. To wit, it is not clear
that simple comparisons between people in managerial and non-managerial
positions will provide the appropriate contrast. Indeed, those in managerial
positions are likely to be more educated but otherwise similar to others. Also,
relating variance in income and risk aversion across various sectors may pick
up unexplained variation in wages across sectors that may be correlated with
risk.
To avoid these problems, we collect experimental data on risk preferences
in a random sample of managers of micro-enterprises in a fast-growing eco-
nomic cluster. All firms in this cluster are involved in small manufacturing
and are geographically close. We exploit the fact that many firms in this
sector are managed by owners (entrepreneurs), but many others are man-
aged by agents. Owner-managers and agent-managers face similar risks and
market conditions. Moreover, in this context, business activity takes place
with limited financial intermediation, so one expects risk preferences to be
important. All this makes our sample ideal to compare the preferences of en-
trepreneurs with that of agents. If people select into activities according to
their preferences, we should expect that those managing their own enterprises
will be less risk averse than agents.
Indeed, we find strong evidence that agents are more risk averse than
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owners as theory suggests. In our experiments, agent-managers are more
conservative in paid lotteries over gains as well as in lotteries over gains and
losses. We test if our results are robust to the inclusion of covariate data,
and we find that our basic result changes little. People sort into activities
according to risk preferences. Moreover, we find evidence that experimental
data correlates with important financial decisions. This provides evidence
of the usefulness of experimental methods in understanding basic economic
hypotheses and also of the importance of carefully selecting samples to make
these hypotheses testable.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the sample and
experimental methods. Section 3 presents basic experimental results and its
relationship with economic decisions. Section 4 concludes.
2. Sample Selection and Design
The study was conducted in Gamarra, a fast-growing economic cluster in
Lima, Peru. Gamarra is akin to the Garment District in New York; it is a
sector full of firms involved in small-scale manufacturing and trade. Most of
Gamarra’s entrepreneurs are migrants that started their business outside the
formal financial system. Until the early nineties, this sector has faced little
regulation or support, making it a unique laboratory of how market forces
work.1
Gamarra is a 12-square block area in Lima, Peru. It emerged in the
1960’s as an area where migrants started small textile businesses to supply
the growing garment industry. Since its inception, the area has attracted
migrants and entrepreneurs for its agglomeration economies. Now, the area
hosts thousands of small firms engaged in small manufacturing (i.e. retail,
consumption and wholesale goods) and trade. Because of their small size,
firms are capable of quickly adapting production to the needs of the market.
1In 1995, a new simplified tax system was implemented to make it possible for small
business to pay taxes. Further modifications were introduced in 2003.
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This make the area dynamic and attractive to those willing to take risks.
In order to secure a random sample of the population of businesses, first,
a pre-census of all establishments was conducted. Then, a random sample of
establishments was selected. The manager of the establishment was surveyed
on the characteristics of the firm. This survey collected information on the
assets, age, size and financial matters as well as informal business networks.
A separate, extensive survey was conducted to gather information on the
manager’s household. As part of the household survey, the manager was
asked a few lotteries questions. These lotteries were only asked of managers,
many of whom were owners of the firm as well. The experimental procedures
are explained further below.
Table 1 presents a summary of the population of managers and firms.
The data are restricted to firms managed by men because, of the 360 firms
interviewed, only 47 were managed by women. Also, of the firms managed
by women, 91% are also owners. Because of the small variation in agents and
owners among women, we focus our analysis on the male-managed firms. All
the results in the paper hold, however, if women are included.2
Looking at Table 1, sixty percent of firms are managed by their owners.
Eighty-eight percent of managers are married, 85 percent finished high school
and 23 percent have a college degree. The average age is 43 years. The table
shows that the households of managers are not rich by Peruvian standards,
where average, annual per-capita income at the time of the study was 18,000
soles. They are not poor either. They have an annual per capita income
three times higher than the poverty line of 6.6 soles a day.3
2One notable difference between men and women is their risk aversion. Women are
more risk loving than men. This issue, however, is addressed in another paper (Castillo,
Petrie, Torero, 2007).
3Two dollars a day (6.6 soles) is one poverty line measure. This income equates to
around 2,400 soles a year at the time of the survey (US$1 = 3.3 soles).
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics - Gamarra - Means
Managers
Owner (percent) 60.38 (3.0)
Married (percent) 88.45 (5.0)
High School (percent) 84.98 (2.0)
College (percent) 23.32 (2.0)
Age (years) 43.40 (0.68)
Annual Per Cap. Income (,000) - soles 8.89 (0.62)
Annual Per Cap. Inc. - Owner (,000) - soles 9.76 (0.97)
Annual Per Cap. Inc. - Non Owner (,000) - soles 7.57 (0.54)
Household Size 3.89 (0.10)
Firms
Number of Workers 3.31 (0.14)
Age of Firm (years) 5.07 (0.30)
Monthly Income (,000) - soles 15.30 (0.67)
Profit (percent) 61.74 (6.74)
Total Capital (,000) - soles 49.32 (9.70)
Observations 313
standard errors in parentheses, exchange rate (3.3 soles=US$1)
The average size of the firm is 3.3 members, with a maximum size of 26
in our sample. Most firms are relative young, 5.1 years old on average, with
the youngest being less than a year and the oldest being 32 years old. The
firms have an average income slightly below US$5000 per year and the value
of assets is around US$14,000. In an typical month, the average profit per
firm is 62 cent per dollar.
To elicit risk preferences, all managers were asked to respond to a series
of simple lotteries. The lotteries are a simplified version of the lotteries
first used by Binswanger (1980). Managers were asked to choose one of
five risky prospects that gave a high and low payoff with equal probability.
The lotteries are listed in Table 2. They were constructed by either adding
30 × k or subtracting 10 × k, k = 1, ..., 4, to an initial high and low payoff
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of (50, 50) or (0, 0). The first set of lotteries therefore were over gains and
the second over gains and losses. The units of the lottery were cents of the
local currency.4 Managers made their decision over gains, then over gains
and losses. Lotteries were resolved by flipping a coin. Managers were paid
in cash the sum of their earnings from the gain and gain-loss lotteries.
3. Results
3.1. Basic Results
This section discusses the results of our experiment. Table 2 presents
the frequency with which each lottery was chosen and the average decisions
made according to several socio-economic variables. Forty-nine managers
did not answer the lottery question. There does not appear to be selection
on observables. While richer households are more likely answer the lottery
question, owners are no more likely than non-owners to answer. There are
no other differences (i.e. by age, education, etc.).
The top panel of Table 2 shows that choices are distributed evenly in the
lottery over gains. The lottery over gains and losses, however, generates a
significantly larger proportion of safe choices.5 The significant increase in
risk aversion in the lotteries over gains and losses is as pronounced as the
shift towards safe bets reported by Binswanger (1980, 1981) and Holt and
Laury (2002) in lotteries with large stakes versus lotteries with small stakes.
That behavior across lotteries varies in an intuitive way gives us confi-
dence that subjects took them seriously despite the small stakes. This would
seem to be at odds with the assumption that the utility function for money
is arbitrarily close to linear over small amounts of money. However, Holt and
Laury (2002) show significant evidence of risk aversion even when lotteries
use small stakes and that risk aversion increases as payoffs are scaled up.
4One hundred cents, or 1 sol, could buy a person lunch in Gamarra.
5The χ2(4) test of difference in distributions is 39.34 (p-value < 0.000).
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They also show that it is possible to find evidence of risk aversion over small
stakes without implying impossibly high levels of risk aversion over large
stakes.
Table 2. Experimental Data
Distribution of Choices
Gains Gains & Losses
High & Low Payoff Frequency High & Low Payoff Frequency
(50,50) 18.56 (0,0) 31.44
(80,40) 23.86 (30,-10) 29.19
(110,30) 20.45 (60,-20) 20.45
(140,20) 18.18 (90,-30) 13.26
(170,10) 18.94 (120,-40) 5.68
Observations 264 Observations 264
Average Responses
Gains Gains & Losses
Variable No Yes t-test (p-value) No Yes t-test (p-value)
Owner 2.70 3.12 -2.45 (0.02) 2.15 2.44 -1.93 (0.05)
40 years or older 2.96 2.94 0.11 (0.91) 2.45 2.21 1.60 (0.11)
Above Median Income 2.86 3.05 -1.11 (0.27) 2.23 2.42 -1.22 (0.22)
High School 2.48 3.04 -2.37 (0.02) 2.03 2.38 -1.72 (0.09)
Also, our lotteries provide a direct test of the hypothesis of constant
absolute risk aversion. By design, the payoffs of both lotteries differ only by
a constant (50). The definition of constant absolute risk aversion implies,
therefore, we should not expect any change in behavior across lotteries. We
conclude then that managers possess either decreasing absolute risk aversion
or suffer from loss aversion.6
The second panel of Table 2 compares risk preferences across different
segments of the population of managers. The first 3 columns of the bottom
panel present comparisons for the lotteries over gains and the last 3 columns
6Given the small stakes of our lotteries, the hypothesis of loss aversion seems more
plausible.
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present comparisons for the lotteries over gains and losses. We find that
owners are significantly less risk averse than managers. This is true in both
lotteries. On average, the decision of an owner-manager is 19 percent higher
than of an agent-manager. While we find differences across other populations,
evidence on other personal or household characteristics is less robust.
Table 3 presents regression analysis of individual decisions. The availabil-
ity of survey data on managers and their households allow us to test whether
the difference in behavior is just a reflection of different socio-economic back-
grounds. Since choices are ordered by risk, we use an ordered logit regression.
The regressions control for education, age, income, family size and a poly-
choric index (Angeles and Kolenikov, 2004) of household assets and durable
goods. The results are unchanged if additional controls are added or if we
control by type of business (i.e. retail, consumption, or wholesale).7
Table 3 confirms that the effect of ownership remains even when con-
trolling for additional covariates. Our results suggest that entrepreneurs
are different from other managers. Even controlling for income and wealth,
owners than manage their own firms are significantly less risk averse than
managers who do the same job but for others. This is remarkable given that
our sampling procedure eliminates many of the potential confounding effects
by holding occupation and market conditions constant. Our results are im-
portant because they confirm economists’ fundamental views of markets and
social interactions. Entrepreneurs are more tolerant to risk and agents are
more risk averse than principals.
7For instance, the results are similar if we add controls for experience and household
age composition among others.
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Table 3. Ordered Logit Regressions on Lottery Choices
Gains G&L Gains G&L
Owner 0.602** 0.602** 0.463* 0.452*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.052) (0.059)
High School 1.082*** 1.113*** 0.782** 0.664*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.027) (0.066)
College -0.582** -0.576** -0.311 -0.371
(0.037) (0.041) (0.257) (0.181)
Age (years) 0.004 0.002 0.005 -0.006
(0.958) (0.976) (0.943) (0.928)
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.821) (0.802) (0.857) (0.908)
Log of Household Income 0.259* 0.275* 0.183 0.063
(0.079) (0.095) (0.207) (0.700)
Family Size -0.112 -0.120* -0.031 -0.026
(0.115) (0.093) (0.664) (0.717)
Index of Household Characteristics 0.089 0.059
(0.503) (0.644)
Index of Household Assets -0.068 0.170
(0.556) (0.137)
Log-Likelihood -411.38 -411.05 -384.04 -382.61
N 264 264 264 264
p-values in parentheses, * p-value < .1, ** p-value < .05, *** p-value < .01
Evidence that simple lotteries capture differences in preferences across the
population is mixed.8 Eckel and Grossman (2007) use an instrument similar
to ours and provide evidence that some instruments might be insensitive to
characteristics, not lotteries in general. Clearly, if instruments only weakly
capture subjects’ preferences, it would be difficult to find effects unless they
are really strong. In that sense, our sampling procedure, that builds on the
influence of risk preference on sorting, would be better at detecting difference
8For instance, Holt and Laury (2002) find that risk aversion is weakly related or not at
all with gender, major, or race. Dave, Eckel, Johnson and Rojas (2007) find a correlation
between several risk measures and gender. Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Schupp and Wagner
(2005) find correlations between risk lotteries and gender, age and height. For an excellent
review of the literature on risk and gender, see Croson and Gneezy (2007).
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in the population.
We would also like to know if risk preferences elicited with lotteries and
actual economic outcomes are correlated. The evidence from the literature is
mixed. Some have found a correlation. For example, Binswanger (1980, 1981)
finds agricultural investment decisions related to risk measures. Jacobson
and Petrie (2007) find no correlation between household savings decisions
and risk measures. We speculate that these inconclusive results may be due
to the types of decisions (i.e. household versus business) to which these risk
preferences are being related. In the next section, we look at the correlation
between our risk measures and household and business decisions.
3.2. Risk Preferences and Economic Decisions
A potential concern is that experimental data, while strongly correlated
with personal characteristics, is uncorrelated with important economic deci-
sions.9 Table 4 presents Tobit regressions on the amount saved and on the
amount of loans held. The first decision is a household financial decision, and
the second is a firm financial decision. All regressions control for household
and firm characteristics and for whether the manager is the owner or not.
Finally, we include the decisions made by the manager in either the lottery
over gains or the lottery over gains and losses.
We find that while decisions in the experiments are weakly and insignifi-
cantly correlated with household savings, lotteries are positively and signif-
icantly correlated with the amount of credit held by the firm. This result
is to be expected since household decisions are not solely a function of the
manager’s preferences but, potentially, also of other household members’
preferences. Credit decisions, on the other hand, are under the control of
managers. This result reassures us of the external validity of experimental
methods and that our measures actually explain decisions. We have already
9Of course, preferences may not be correlated with economic decisions because of het-
erogeneous expectations. We do not explore that here.
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established that risk preference are partially captured by being an owner.
So, the effect measured in this regression is likely to underestimate the total
effect of risk preferences on economic decisions.
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Table 4. Tobit Regressions on Financial Decisions
Savings (,000) Loans (,000)
Choice in Gain Lottery 1.093 1.069
(0.114) (0.254)
Choice in Gain & Loss Lottery 0.293 1.863*
(0.703) (0.065)
Owner 1.583 2.157 10.904*** 10.702***
(0.449) (0.312) (0.001) (0.001)
High School -0.566 -0.232 -4.149 -3.709
(0.864) (0.945) (0.257) (0.298)
College 2.460 1.938 4.087 3.847
(0.247) (0.369) (0.181) (0.199)
Age (years) 0.423 0.529 2.112** 2.148**
(0.564) (0.485) (0.041) (0.036)
Age Square -0.007 -0.008 -0.024** -0.025**
(0.393) (0.346) (0.036) (0.033)
Log of Household Income 1.534 1.809 4.556** 4.765**
(0.265) (0.205) (0.020) (0.014)
Family Size -0.646 -0.807* -0.230 -0.152
(0.332) (0.225) (0.782) (0.854)
Index of Household Characteristics -1.734 -1.672 -0.003 -0.054
(0.132) (0.158) (0.998) (0.972)
Index of Household Assets 3.472*** 3.489*** -1.807 -2.105
(0.000) (0.000) (0.187) (0.130)
Firm Age (Months) -0.009 -0.007 -0.017 -0.014
(0.565) (0.639) (0.444) (0.502)
Number of Workers 0.545* 0.593* 0.247 0.197
(0.074) (0.061) (0.566) (0.644)
Firms is Registered 4.236 4.495 -3.479 -3.287
(0.364) (0.355) (0.415) (0.441)
Implicit Interest Rate (00) 0.662 0.800 0.222* 0.218*
(0.753) (0.712) 0.077 (0.078)
Constant -38.731* -42.225* -105.684*** -110.779***
(0.067) (0.053) (0.001) (0.001)
Log-Likelihood -158.68 -159.86 -266.96 -265.86
Observations 264 264 264 264
p-values in parentheses, * p-value < .1, ** p-value < .05, *** p-value < .01
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The estimates indicate that, conditional on taking a loan, the marginal ef-
fect of one higher choice in the lottery over gains would double the amount of
credit held by the firm. One higher choice in the lottery over gains and losses
would triple the amount of credit held. This is true even controlling for per-
sonal and firm characteristics.10 This is important because our experiments
not only detect important differences in the preferences of the population,
but also identify statistically and economically significant consequence of risk
preference on decisions. This suggests that previous results that show that
risk experiments are either insensitive to preferences or uninformative about
decision making might partially be due to the experimental instrument and
sample choice. Indeed, the issue of heterogeneity of beliefs is less of a problem
in our sample due to the fact that subjects in our experiment face similar
market conditions.
4. Conclusions
We investigate whether risk preferences of economic agents are important
in market economies and explain sorting into jobs. Using a simple experimen-
tal procedure, we measure risk preferences in a random sample of business
managers. All the managers work in a dynamic small manufacturing cluster,
share similar socio-economic backgrounds, face similar market conditions,
but differ in their ownership of a business. Our design reduces many of the
confounding effects encountered in other studies of risk and increases the
external validity of our results.
We find two key results. First, managers that own the firm where they
work are significantly less risk averse than managers that do not own the
firm. This result is robust to the inclusion of socio-economic characteristics
of managers and type of manufacturing. This supports the theoretical as-
sumption that agents are more risk averse than principals. Second, our study
10Choices in the lotteries are correlated with other financial decisions like having par-
ticipated in credit groups or holding credit cards.
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gives strong support to the basic economic intuition that entrepreneurs are
different and markets encourage them to sort into activities that require deal-
ing with significant risks. Our measures of risk aversion are correlated with
business financial decisions made by the manager.
Our study gives support to the importance of field experiments, as ar-
ticulated by Harrison and List (2004). Taking experimental methods to the
population of interest and sampling from a population where confounding
effects are less likely to be an issue seem to be important. Experimental
methods can not only be a powerful tool to detect differences in preferences,
but they can also detect evidence of sorting. The distribution of preferences
across principals and agents in a business sector seems to be consistent with
economic theory.
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